We show that the distribution of Z can be obtained as a convex combination (1 − ε)G + εH, where G is the distribution of a Gaussian random variable with mean zero and (possibly large) variance, and H is the distribution of an additional noise term with heavy tails. The weight ε can be taken to be arbitrarily small. Hence, up to a vanishing degree of error, the background risk is indistinguishable from Gaussian noise. The role played by H is to produce a distribution displaying sufficiently thick tails, a feature that, as we show, is necessary for the background noise to lead to stochastic dominance.
Interestingly, Acemoglu et al. (2017) provide evidence of key macroeconomic variablespresumably related to individual risk-that take a form similar to the one described above: their distributions are approximately Gaussian around their mean but display heavier tails. Our results, therefore, provide a bridge between the analysis of choice under risk and the study of distributions with thick tail, a subject of long and renewed interest across different fields of economics, including macroeconomics (Gabaix et al., 2006; Morris and Yildiz, 2016) , finance (Gabaix et al., 2003; Kelly and Jiang, 2014) , as well as other disciplines (Nair et al., 2013) .
As is well-known, ranking risky prospects solely in terms of their mean and variance is a crude approach for decision-making under risk, especially if compared to expected utility theory. Nevertheless, mean and variance remain key statistics driving the decisions of practitioners and investors. The main conceptual contribution of this paper is to show that such a seemingly ad-hoc approach can be justified in the presence of suitable background risk: while first and second order stochastic dominance are much stronger orders than the comparisons of means and variances, our results suggest that the latter are, under background risk, surprisingly good proxies for the former.
We present applications of our findings to choice over lotteries in the presence of background risk, to the characterization of mean-variance preferences of Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958) , and to mechanism design with risk averse agents.
Definitions and Main Results
Recall that a random variable X first-order stochastically dominates Y , denoted X ≥ 1 Y , if it satisfies E[φ(X)] ≥ E[φ(Y )] for every increasing function φ for which the two expectations are well defined. We write X > 1 Y if X and Y have distinct distributions (equivalently, if X ≥ 1 Y but Y ≥ 1 X). 1 A random variable X second-order stochastically dominates Y , denoted X ≥ 2 Y , if E[φ(X)] ≥ E[φ(Y )] for every concave increasing function φ for which the two expectations are well defined. As before, we write X > 2 Y if X and Y have distinct distributions.
The following standard result will be useful. Given any two random variables X and Y , if X ≥ 1 Y then X + Z ≥ 1 Y + Z for any Z that is independent from the two. 2 Hence, two variables that are ranked in terms of stochastic dominance remain so after the addition of independent noise. The corresponding conclusion holds for second-order stochastic dominance. We denote by P ∞ the set of random variables, or gambles, X that have all finite moments. That is, a gamble X belongs to P ∞ if E[|X| n ] is finite for all n ∈ N.
We can now state our first main result:
Theorem 1. Let X and Y be random variables with finite expectation. If E[X] > E[Y ]
then there exists a random variable Z that is independent from X and Y and such that
Moreover, if X, Y ∈ P ∞ then Z can be taken to belong to P ∞ .
By taking φ to be linear, the converse to the result is also true: if there exists a variable Z for which (1) holds, then two distributions must satisfy
. When Z has finite expectation, this follows from the fact that any two variables that are ranked by > 1 are also ranked by their expectation.
It is important to point out that the conclusion of Theorem 1 is true not with respect to just a single random variable Z but for a general class of distributions. The relation X + W > 1 Y + W holds for any W = Z + Z 1 + . . . + Z n that is obtained from Z by the addition of extra terms (Z i ) that are independent from X, Y and Z.
Our second main result parallels Theorem 1 and establishes an analogous conclusion for second-order stochastic dominance: 
Proof Sketch and Discussion
Underlying Theorem 1 is the following intuition. As is well known, first-order stochastic dominance between X + Z and Y + Z is equivalent to the requirement that the cumulative distribution function (or cdf ) F Y +Z of the gamble Y + Z is greater, pointwise, than the cdf F X+Z of X + Z.
The assumption that X has higher expectation than Y implies, using integration by parts, that the cdfs of the two random variables must satisfy
So, on average, the cumulative distribution function F Y must lie above F X . Now consider adding an independent random variable Z, distributed according to a probability density f Z . Then, given a point s ∈ R, the difference between the resulting cdfs can be expressed as
If f Z is sufficiently diffuse (for instance, by taking Z to be uniformly distributed around s over a sufficiently large support) then it follows from the strict inequality (2) that the difference (3) is positive in a neighborhood of s. So, the crucial difficulty in establishing Theorem 1 is to show the existence of a welldefined distribution such that the difference F Y +Z − F X+Z is positive everywhere. The existence of such a distribution F Z is not trivial. The proof of Theorem 1 provides an explicit construction, building on mathematical techniques introduced, in a different context, by Ruzsa and Székely (1988) .
While the details of the construction are somewhat technical, the background risk in Theorem 1 can be approximated (in terms of total variation distance) by Gaussian noise, up to a vanishing degree of error: Remark 1. Let X and Y be as in Theorem 1. For every ε ∈ (0, 1) there exists a random variable Z that satisfies (1) and is distributed according to
where G is the cdf of a Gaussian random variable with mean zero, and H is the cdf of a random variable.
In the proof of Theorem 1, the background risk Z is defined as follows. We construct a sequence U 1 , U 2 , . . . of i.i.d. random variables and an independent geometric random variable N such that P[N = n] = (1 − ε)ε n for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Letting W be an independent Gaussian random variable, we define
So, the random variable Z is obtained as a sum of mean-zero Gaussian noise and geometric sum of independent noise terms. With probability 1 − ε the variable N takes value 0 and therefore Z reduces to standard Gaussian noise. With probability (1 − ε)ε n , n additional terms U 1 + . . . + U n contribute to the background risk.
Orders of Magnitude
An immediate question, at this point, is to understand the orders of magnitude involved. In particular, how large does the background risk need to be?
We consider, as a representative example, a decision maker who is confronted with a small gamble X with positive expectation, and the choice of whether to take X or to receive 0 for sure. We show that a reasonable background risk Z suffices to make X dominant.
In particular, suppose X pays $12 and −$10 with equal probabilities. Then, there exists a background risk Z, of the form described in (4), that satisfies Z + X > 1 Z, and has the following properties: its distribution is a mixture that gives weight 1 − ε = 0.99 to a Gaussian with standard deviation $3,500. The standard deviation of Z itself is $3,525. If X pays $100 and -$50, then we can set ε = 0.022 and the standard deviation of Z is $4,551. 3
Uniformity
In this section we address the following two questions. First, is the noise term obtained in Theorem 1 robust to changes in the distribution of X and Y ? Moreover, can it be given a closed-form description? By restricting the attention to random variables with bounded support, we provide positive answers to both questions.
We consider pairs of random variables X and Y such that: Given M and ε, we construct a variable Z that satisfies X + Z > 1 Y + Z for any pair X and Y for which (a) and (b) hold. In addition, we show that Z can be taken to be a combination of uniformly distributed random variables.
The random variable Z is defined by three parameters: M and ε, as described above, as well as a parameter a > 0, which for the next result we are going to take to be sufficiently large. Let U 1 , U 2 , . . . be i.i.d. random variables that are uniformly distributed on the union
Let N be an independent geometric random variable with parameter 1/2, so that P[N = n] = 2 −1−n for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Finally, let R 1 and R 2 be variables independent from N and U 1 , U 2 , . . . and uniformly distributed on [−a, a] . We define
So, the random variable Z is obtained as a sum of mean-zero, independent noise terms that are uniformly distributed.
Notice that for smaller ε, as the difference in expectation between X and Y becomes negligible, the support of each term U i becomes increasingly large. The random variable Z is reasonably "well-behaved": for example, it has all moments, and exponentially vanishing tails. Using Wald's Lemma, its variance can be shown to be
so that its standard deviation is of order M ε −1 , and never more than 30M ε −1 . To put this into perspective, consider an agent who must make a choice between two lotteries that pay between -$10 and $10, and whose expected value differs by at least $1. Theorem 3 implies that there exists a zero mean independent background noise which-for any utility function-makes the lottery with the higher expectation preferable. Moreover, this noise need not be incredibly large: a standard deviation of $3000 suffices.
Applications

Choices and Background Risk
The next result, an immediate corollary of Theorem 1, shows that large background risk can lead to risk neutral behavior: Given a finite set of gambles, there is a source of background risk such that any agent whose preferences are monotone with respect to firstorder stochastic dominance will rank as more preferable gambles with higher expectation.
Then there is an independent Z ∈ P ∞ such that
Proof. For each i there is an independent
Corollary 1 is reminiscent of the classical Arrow-Pratt approximation. As is well known, any expected utility maximizer, when choosing out of a finite menu of monetary gambles that are sufficiently small, will behave approximately as a risk neutral agent, and select as optimal the gamble with the highest expected value. 4 Corollary 1 establishes a similar conclusion for the case where the gambles under consideration are coupled with a suitable background risk Z. It implies that a decision maker who has preferences that are consistent with first-order stochastic dominance-a class much larger than expected utility 5 -will behave like a risk-neutral expected utility maximizer when facing some (potentially large) background risks.
Mean-Variance Preferences
In this section we apply Theorem 2 to provide a simple axiomatization of the classic mean-variance preferences of Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958) . 6 We consider a decision maker whose preferences over monetary lotteries are described by a certainty equivalent functional C : P ∞ → R that associates to each lottery X the sure amount of money C(X) that makes her indifferent between X and C(X).
With slight abuse of notation, we denote by x the constant random variable that takes value x ∈ R. For the next result, a gamble X is said to be a mean preserving spread of Y if the two have the same expectation and Y second-order stochastically dominates X. 7 Proposition 1. A functional C : P ∞ → R satisfies:
if and only if there exists k ≥ 0 such that
Proposition 1 characterizes mean-variance preferences by three simple properties. The Certainty axiom is necessary for C(X) to be interpreted as a certainty equivalent. Monotonicity requires C to rank as more desirable gambles that are less dispersed around their mean. The Additivity axiom says that the certainty equivalent is additive for independent gambles.
4 More precisely, consider a set of gambles {kX1, . . . , kXn} where k ≥ 0 measures the size of the risk.
Under expected utility and a differentiable utility function, the certainty equivalent of each kXi is given by kE[Xi] plus a term vanishing at rate k 2 . 5 Commonly used examples in this large class are cumulative prospect theory preferences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) , rank dependent utility (Quiggin, 1991) and cautious expected utility (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015) . 6 A previous axiomatization appears in Epstein (1985) , for DARA preferences. Related results are due to Maccheroni et al. (2006 Maccheroni et al. ( , 2009 . 7 Equivalently, X is smaller than Y in the convex order.
A key step in the proof of Proposition 1 is to show that when restricted to mean 0 random variables, a functional C that satisfies properties (1)- (3) is a decreasing function of the variance. This is an immediate implication of Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. It is immediate to verify that properties (1)- (3) are satisfied by the representation. We now prove the converse implication.
Suppose
. Then, by Theorem 2, there exists an independent random variable Z such that X +Z > 2 Y +Z. By monotonicity and additivity, this implies 
which is strictly positive for n large enough. However,
, and so, by the first part of the proof, we have that
Thus, restricted to zero mean X ∈ P ∞ , C satisfies C(X) = f (Var[X]) for some function f . In addition, by the first part of the proof, f is nonincreasing. Furthermore, f is additive (i.e., f (x + y) = f (x) + f (y)) since C is additive. As is well known, every nonincreasing additive f : R + → R is linear. To see this, note that if m, n ∈ N, then, letting q = m/n, we have mf (1) = f (m) = f (nq) = nf (q). Thus, f (q) = qf (1) for every rational q. Hence, for every x ∈ R + and positive rational q,
To conclude the proof, notice that for any X (with possibly non-zero mean) additivity and certainty imply
We end this section with an additional result characterizing the expectation as the unique functional on P ∞ that is monotone with respect to first order stochastic dominance, and additive for independent random variable.
Proposition 2. A functional C : P ∞ → R satisfies:
Proof of Proposition 2. This proof closely follows that of Proposition 1. As in that proof, it is immediate to verify that properties (1)- (2) are satisfied by the representation.
Denote (as above) by x the random variable that take the value x ∈ R with probability 1, and define f : R → R by f (x) = C(x). By additivity and monotonicity f is monotone increasing and additive and so, as in the proof of Proposition 1, f (x) = kx for some k ≥ 0. Certainty implies k = 1.
We
Indeed, in this case, by Theorem 1 there is an independent Z ∈ P ∞ such that X + Z > 1 Y + Z, and so by monotonicity
Implementation with Risk Aversion
In this section we show how Theorem 1 can be used to construct mechanisms that are robust to uncertainty about the agents' risk attitudes. Consider a mechanism design problem with n agents, where each agent's type is θ i ∈ Θ i , and θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) is drawn from some joint distribution. We assume that the set of types Θ = i Θ i is finite. The designer chooses an allocation x ∈ X and a transfer t i ∈ R for each agent i. By the revelation principle we can without loss of generality restrict to mechanisms where each agent reports their type and it is optimal for the agents to be truthful. A direct mechanism (x, t) is a tuple consisting of an allocation function x :
We restrict attention to mechanisms where each random transfer t i (θ) has all moments. Most of the literature on mechanism design focuses on the quasi-linear case, where agent i's utility is given by
Here, v i (x, θ) denotes the monetary equivalent of the utility agent i derives from the physical allocation x when the type profile equals θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ). Note, that as v depends on the complete type profile we allow for interdependent values.
A restriction which is imposed when assuming quasi-linear preferences is that the agents are risk neutral over money. To more generally model agents who might not be risk neutral, we assume that preferences are of the form
where u i : R → R is agent i's utility function over money. We assume u i is bounded by a polynomial; see Section 5 for a discussion of this integrability assumption. Preferences (6) are commonly considered in the literature on auctions with risk aversion (for example case 1. in Maskin and Riley, 1984) or in the literature on optimal income taxation (see for example Diamond, 1998) . A mechanism (x, t) is Bayes incentive compatible if for every type θ i and every agent i it is optimal to report her type truthfully to the mechanism, given that all other players do the same
A mechanism is Bayes incentive compatible (BIC) under quasi-linear preferences if it satisfies (u-BIC) when all agents' utilities over money are linear, i.e. u i (x) = x. A mechanism is strictly Bayes incentive compatible if the maximum in (u-BIC) is unique. Bayes incentive compatibility depends on the utility functions u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and thus the risk attitudes of the agents. We are interested in finding mechanisms which implement a given physical allocation x for any vector of utilities. To explicitly model this problem we consider the stronger notion of ordinal incentive compatibility (d 'Aspremont and Peleg, 1988) . Definition 1. A direct mechanism (x, t) is ordinal incentive compatible if (u-BIC) is satisfied for all non-decreasing utility functions u 1 , . . . , u n .
It is natural to ask which physical allocation rules x can be implemented ordinally. 8 Our main result in this section is that (essentially) any allocation that can be implemented when the agents have quasi-linear utilities can also be implemented when the agents have arbitrary utilities u that are unknown to the designer. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, knowledge of the agents risk attitudes is not necessary to implement a given allocation. To make a Bayes IC mechanism ordinally IC it suffices to add a carefully chosen risk to the transfer that is independent of the agents' reports. 
+ Z i for every every θ i , and so the mechanism (x, τ ) with
The result has the following additional implication. As (x, t) and (x, τ ) implement the same physical allocation x, it follows that the set of strictly implementable physical allocations is the same under Bayes IC and ordinal IC. This is in contrast to dominant strategy IC for which the set of implementable physical allocations is strictly smaller. 9
In our analysis we have abstracted away from individual rationality. A mechanism that is individually rational when agents are risk neutral is not necessarily individually rational when u i is concave. The addition of background noise may violate individual rationality for risk averse agents, and thus require the agents to be compensated to ensure their participation. This, however, would not change the set of implementable physical allocation rules.
Discussion
Unbounded Support and Tail Risk. We first observe that the noise term Z in Theorem 1 cannot have bounded support, unless additional assumptions are imposed on X and Y . This holds even if we only consider bounded X and Y . Indeed, in order for X + Z > 1 Y + Z to be satisfied, the maximum of the support of X + Z must lie weakly above that of Y + Z. In particular, if Z has bounded bounded and X + Z > 1 Y + Z, then the maximum of the support of X must be greater than the maximum of the support Y .
In addition, the background risk Z must generally display non-negligible risk at the tails. For instance, it is impossible for a Gaussian Z to satisfy Theorem 3; this holds even if we restrict the random variables in question to be finitely supported. Indeed, any Z that satisfies Theorem 3 must have thick tails in the sense that E[exp(tZ)] = ∞ for some t ∈ R large enough.
To see the necessity for thick tailed distributions, note that if the maximum of the support of X is strictly less than that of Y (which of course does not preclude that
for t large enough. Hence for any independent Z for which E[exp(tZ)] is finite it holds that E e t(X+Z) = E e tX · E e tZ < E e tY · E e tZ = E e t(Y +Z) , and so it cannot be that X + Z > 1 Y + Z.
Integrability As is well known, distributions with unbounded support require the specification of a class of utility functions for which all expectations are finite, so that issues similar to the St. Petersburg paradox do not arise. A standard solution is to restrict attention to utility functions that are bounded. See, e.g., Aumann (1977) . More generally, following Russell and Seo (1978) (see also Ryan, 1974; Arrow, 1974) , one may wish to consider utility functions that have polynomial tails. This assumption is more general and allows for utility functions that are strictly increasing and strictly concave everywhere. 10 For any such u and gamble X ∈ P ∞ with all finite moments, the resulting expected utility E[u(X)] is well-defined and finite.
By definition, distributions with thick tails rule out CARA as a class of utility functions for which integrability is preserved. This, however, does not make thick tailed distributions pathological. Many standard distributions have thick tails: examples include geometric, exponential and gamma distributions. All of these have finite moments and exponentially vanishing tails. Distribution with thick tails have been used to describe many economic variables of interest (Acemoglu et al., 2017) , and are the subject of a growing literature in the economics (see, e.g., Morris and Yildiz, 2016) .
Conclusion
Our main result establishes a connection between two orderings-having strictly greater mean and first-order stochastic dominance-that differ substantially in their strength and implications. This paper leaves open many questions, specifically regarding more quantitative versions of our results and their comparison to empirical and experimental studies of choice with background risk. Some of these questions will be addressed in Mu et al. (2018) .
10 Given any utility function u : R → R and an arbitrarily large bounded interval, there exists a utility v that agrees with u on that interval and can be taken to be bounded or with polynomial tails. So, both assumptions amount to non-falsifiable integrability conditions.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Denote by P n the collection of all Borel probability measures on R that have finite nth moment:
We denote P ∞ = n P n . Likewise, denote by M n the collection of all bounded Borel signed measures on R that have finite nth moment. That is, µ ∈ M n if R |x| n dµ(x) < ∞.
Recall that a signed measure µ is bounded if its absolute value |µ| is a finite measure. As usual, given µ, ν ∈ M n we write µ ≥ ν if µ(A) ≥ ν(A) for every Borel A ⊆ R. We equip M n with the total-variation norm
We denote the convolution of µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ M n (and in its subset P n ) by µ 1 * µ 2 , and by µ (k) the k-fold convolution of µ with itself for all k ≥ 1. To simplify notation we define µ (0) to be δ, the Dirac measure at zero, so that µ (k) * µ (m) = µ (k+m) for all k, m ≥ 0. Note that M n , equipped with the norm defined above, is a Banach space which is closed under convolutions. In fact, (M n , * , +) is a Banach algebra, so that µ
The following lemma is due to Ruzsa and Székely (1988, pp. 126-127) . It states that a signed measure that assigns total mass 1 to R can be "smoothed" into a probability measure by convolving it with an appropriately chosen probability measure. We provide the proof for the reader's convenience; an essentially identical proof also appears in Mattner (1999, p. 616) , as well as in Mattner (2004, p. 159) .
Lemma 1 (Ruzsa and Székely, Mattner) . Let n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ∞}. For every µ ∈ M n with µ(R) = 1 there is a ν ∈ P n such that µ * ν ∈ P n .
Proof. Let ρ a be the measure of a Gaussian random variable with mean zero and standard deviation a > 0. 11 . For some 0 < c < 1 and some π ∈ P n let
where π (0) is δ, the Dirac measure at zero. Since c < 1 the series converges and so τ is a probability measure. Let
We show that µ * ν ∈ P n for an appropriate choice of a, c and π. To see that µ * ν is a probability measure note first that [µ * ν](R) = 1, 12 and so it suffices to show that µ * ν 11 One could take here any other distribution (e.g., the uniform probability distribution on [−a, a]) such that ρ
a ≥ βρa for some β > 0. 12 This follows immediately from the fact that
is positive. To see this, we write
Now, by the definition of τ ,
Hence (δ − cπ) * τ = (1 − c)δ, and so
It follows by comparing the densities of ρ
a and ρ a that ρ
Thus, if we choose a, c and π so that √ 2 c ρ a * (µ − δ) + π is a positive measure it will follow that µ * ν is also positive. To this end we set
and if 0 < c < 1. If c = 0 for some a then ρ a * µ = ρ a and we can take ν = ρ a to conclude the proof of the theorem. In addition, c = √ 2 (µ − δ) * ρ a tends to 0 as a tends to infinity, 13 so we can choose a large enough so that c < 1, and in fact c as small as we like.
13 Let δy be the point mass at y. Then δy * ρa is a Gaussian distribution with mean y and standard deviation a. The Kullback-Leibler divergence between the two is well-known to be D(δy * ρa ρa) = By Pinsker's Inequality,
, and so
which tends to 0 as a tends to infinity.
We have shown that µ * ν is a sum of positive measures, hence positive, and hence a probability measure. It remains to be shown that ν has finite nth moment, and hence is in P n . To this end, note first that
and so π ∈ P n . Since the nth moment of π (k) is at most k n times the nth moment of π, it follows that τ ∈ P n , and so ν = ρ
It is important that the proof of this lemma is constructive; indeed, we get that
for c that can be arbitrarily small, and a that may need to be correspondingly large. Since ρ a is the distribution of a Gaussian with zero mean and standard deviation a, ν is the distribution of
where W is a Gaussian with mean zero and standard deviation √ 2a, X 0 = 0, X 1 , X 2 , . . . are i.i.d. random variables with distribution π (defined in the proof), and N is geometric with parameter c. In particular, when c is small, Z is close in total variation to W , as ν − ρ We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 1. Let X and Y be two random variables
Hence σ(R) = 1. Furthermore, σ is a bounded measure, since
Also, if X, Y ∈ P n then σ ∈ M n−1 , since, using integration by parts (i.e., Tonelli's Theorem),
Hence Lemma 1 implies that there exists a probability measure η ∈ P n−1 such that σ * η ∈ P n−1 . Let Z be a random variable independent from X and Y with distribution η. The measure σ is by definition absolutely continuous with density
. Therefore, σ * η is absolutely continuous as well, and its density s satisfies, almost everywhere, 14
Because σ * η is a probability measure and d > 0, then F Y +Z (x) ≥ F X+Z (x) for almost every x. Since the cdfs are right-continuous, this implies F Y +Z ≥ F X+Z . Furthermore, this inequality is strict somewhere, since the integral of k(F Y +Z − F X+Z ) is equal to one. Therefore, X + Z > 1 Y + Z. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1; we have furthermore demonstrated that when X, Y ∈ P n then Z can be taken to be in P n−1 , for any n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∞}. 
By using the assumptions that
] < ∞ and applying integration by parts, it follows that
14 See Fremlin (2002, 257xe) . (Rachev et al., 2013, Lemma 15.2.1) or (Rachev and Stoyanov, 2008, p.160) . Hence σ is bounded. We show that a calculation similar to the one used in Theorem 1 shows that σ(R) = 1 and that σ ∈ M n−2 . More generally, we claim that for every k,
As is well known, integration by parts implies
Hence, for every n and k,
For every n, the last integral is well defined and finite provided X, Y ∈ P k+2 . It is a standard result that every W ∈ P k+2 satisfies n k+2
The first term on the right hand side converges to 0 by the same argument as above, and the second term converges to 0 from the assumption that X, Y ∈ P n+2 . This concludes the proof of the claim. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can invoke Lemma 1 to prove the existence of a probability measure η ∈ P n−1 such that σ * η ∈ P n−1 . Let Z be a random variable 15 This follows from
and the observation that since W k+2 is integrable, the right hand side must converge to 0 as n → ∞.
independent from X and Y with distribution η. Then s(x), the probability density function of σ * η, is
Since σ * η is a probability measure then s(x) is non-negative for almost every x ∈ R. Since F Y +Z and F X+Z are right-continuous, this implies s ≥ 0. Furthermore, this inequality is strict somewhere, since the integral of s is equal to one. Therefore,
for all x is a well known condition for secondorder stochastic dominance (see Theorem 4.A.2 in Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007) .
C Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3 we first prove a version of Lemma 1 that gives a stronger results for a smaller class of measures. Given M, L > 0, denote by M L M the set of bounded signed measures µ that are supported in [−M, M ], and for which |µ| ([a, b] 
Given µ ∈ M ∞ and a > 0, define
where, as in the proof of Lemma 1, δ is the point mass at 0, and ρ a is the uniform distribution on [−a, a] .
and which satisfies the following properties: 
3,500 0.014 3,525 12 10 4,000 0.011 4,025 100 50 4,500 0.022 4,551 100 50 10,000 0.010 10,050 100 70 11,000 0.018 11,102 and because s < s 2 < 0 then φ a (s) − φ a (s 2 ) < 0. Therefore t(s) ≤ 0. This concludes the proof of the claim. We take π to be absolutely continuous with density f . Then (10) is satisfied if
We take f (s) = 0 if s > g (since then t(s) ≤ 0) and
so that f integrates to 1. Given the parameters g, l and a, the coefficient c and the pdf f can be computed numerically. This allows us to describe some quantitative features of the background noise Z, as discussed in section 2.2. Table 1 provides some examples. For instance, when the binary gamble X pays $12 and -$10 dollars with probability 1/2, there exists a background risk Z = W +U 1 +. . .+U N such that X +Z > 1 Z and: the Gaussian W has standard deviation 3,500, P[N = n] = (0.014) n for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, and Z has standard deviation 3,525.
E A Lemma on Strict Bayesian Implementation
Lemma 3. Suppose that x ∈ R n and v i (x, θ) = x i H i (θ i ) where H i : Θ i → R + is strictly increasing in θ i and that types are independently drawn. Then for every Bayes IC mechanism (x, t) and every ǫ > 0 there exists another strictly Bayes IC mechanism (x, τ ) that implements the same physical allocation x and raises at most ǫ less in expected revenue
Proof. Agent i's interim utility when she is of type θ i , but reports to be of type θ ′ i can be written as
where
As the mechanism is Bayes incentive compatible, i.e. satisfies (u-BIC) when u equals the identity, we have that for all θ i , θ
Adding the two equations yield
As H i increases in θ i it follows from the above equation that Q i is non-decreasing. Furthermore, (12) and (13) imply that
We will next argue that the monotonicity of Q i in addition with (14) imposed for adjacent types θ ′ i < θ i are also sufficient for incentive compatibility. 16 Consider an agent who is of type θ i , but who deviates to report that she is of type θ ′ i , which is not necessarily adjacent. Her loss in interim expected utility from this deviation is given by
Suppose now that θ ′ i < θ i and let (θ k ) k∈{0,...,m} be a sequence of adjacent types such that θ ′ i = θ 0 < θ 1 < . . . < θ m = θ i . We have that the gain from deviating is given by
By the monotonicity of Q i and H i we can bound the loss from below by
As we imposed (14) for adjacent types we know that each component of the sum is nonnegative. Hence, the sum is non-negative and no downward deviation is profitable. The case of upward deviations, i.e. θ ′ i > θ i , is completely analogous. We thus have that the mechanism (x, t) is Bayes incentive compatible if and only if Q i is non-decreasing for every agent i and in addition for every two adjacent types θ ′ i < θ i the following equation holds
Thus, an upper bound on the transfer is given by the transfer that solves the right inequality with equality
Note, that for a sufficiently small ǫ the transfer τ i that for adjacent types θ i > θ ′ i solves
and assigns the same transfer τ i (θ i ) = T i (θ i ) to the lowest type θ i as the original transfer T i solves (16) with strict inequality. By (15) this implies that the mechanism is strictly incentive compatible. The mechanism (x, τ ) satisfies τ i (θ i ) ≥ T i (θ i ) − ǫ and thus raises at most ǫ less revenue from each agent. Furthermore, each agent strictly prefers to be truthful over deviating and reporting an adjacent type.
